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OMEN AND WORK 
ND THE CANADIAN 
UMAN RIGHTS ACT 
ary Jane Mossman and Julie Ramona Jai 
After many months of debate, the federal legislation on 
human rights became fully effective on March 1, 1978. 
Part of the legislation, establishing a Canadian Human 
Rights Commission, had been proclaimed in force 
months earlier, in August 1977, but the Canadian 
Human Rights Act became effective as a whole just over 
a year ago. 1 The anti-discrimination provisions of the 
Act apply to employees of federal institutions previously 
outside the ambit of provincial human rights statutes,2 
and, in the words of at least one commentator in early 
1978, the federal Act had potential to "establish the 
federal government as the leader in human rights 
matters."3 
This paper is an assessment of the validity of this 
assertion about the Act's potential having special regard 
to discrimination against women in the workforce. The 
first section of the paper is an outline of the major 
provisions of the Act which affect the position of 
working women. The second section is a theoretical 
analysis of the legislation, focusing on limitations 
inherent in the Act which result both from definitions of 
discriminatory actions and from the choice of legal 
remedies for women facing discriminatory behaviour at 
work. The third section is a brief look at the operation of 
the Canadian Human Rights Commission during its first 
year of activity. 
A. THE CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS ACT: 
AN OVERVIEW 
The purpose of the Act, as stated in s.2, is to give effect 
to the principle that: 
(a) every individual should have an 
equal opportunity with other 
individuals to make for himself or 
herself the life that he or she is able and 
wishes to have, consistent with his or 
her duties and obligations as a member 
of society, without being hindered in or 
prevented from doing so by 
discriminatory practices based on ... 
sex or marital status ... 
Part I of the Act defines discriminatory practices. S. 3 
states that sex and marital status are, among ot!Jirs, 
"prohibited grounds of discrimination". Discriminatory 
practices are defined by ss.5-13. In relation to 
employment, s.7 states 
7. It is a discriminatory practice, directly 
or indirectly, 
(a) to refuse to employ or continue to 
employ an individual, or 
(b) in the course of employment, to 
differentiate adversely in relation to 
an employee, on a prohibited ground 
of discrimination. 
Subsequent sections of the Act prohibit advertising of 
employment which expresses preferences based on 
prohibited grounds of discrimination (s.8), exclusion 
from membership in an employee organization on a 
prohibited ground of discrimination (s.9) 4 and adopt~on 
by an employer or employee organization of a policy or 
agreement which tends to deprive an individual or class 
of individuals of employment opportunities on a 
prohibited ground of discrimination (s.10). S.11 of the 
Act establishes that it is a discriminatory practice for an 
employer to differentiate in wages paid to male and 
female employees employed in the same establishment 
who are performing work of equal value. S.14, 
however, provides that there is no discriminatory 
practice if 
(a) any refusal, exclusion, expulsion, 
suspension, limitation, specification or 
preference in relation to any 
employment is based on a bona fide 
occupational requirement ... 
Thus, since s.14 maybe used to justify employment 
decisions which would otherwise constitute 
discriminatory practices, the interpretation of s.14 is 
critical to an assessment of the role of the Act in 
eliminating discrimination against women in the 
workforce. 
Part II of the Act establishes the Canadian Human 
Rights Commission (s.21), with responsibility for 
administering the Act and for developing information 
programs, research programs, and liaison with 
provincial Human Rights Commissions. The 
Commission may on application or on its own initiative 
issue guidelines binding on the Commission and on any 
human rights tribunal established under the Act 
(s.22(2)) .6 Pursuant to s.15(2), the Commission may also 
give advice and assistance in relation to special programs 
designed to prevent or eliminate disadvantages suffered 
by any group of individuals because of (among other 
factors) sex or marital status, where the special programs 
are designed to improve opportunities for the group. As 
well, the Commission may recommend that federal 
contracts include terms which prohibit diseriminatory 
practices under the Act (s.19). 
Part III contains the mechanism for implementing the 
goals of the Act. The procedure requires the filing of a 
complaint with the Commission by an individual or a 
group having reasonable grounds for believing that a 
person is engaging or has engaged in-a discriminatory 
practice (s.32(1)). If the complaint is filed by someone 
other than the victim of the discriminatory practice, the 
Commission may refuse to deal with the complaint 
unless the victim consents. (s.32(2)). Significantly, 
however, where the Commission has reasonable 
grounds for believing that an employer is engaging in a 
discriminatory practice, the Commission may initiate a 
complaint.7 (s.32(3)). The Commission is required to· 
deal witn any complaint filed unless there has been a 
failure to exhaust other grievance or review procedures 
(s.33) (a) or, for example, the complaint is trivial, 
frivolous, vexatious, or made in bad faith. 
(s.33 (b )(iii)). 
In dealing with complaints, the Commission may 
appoint an investigator (s.35) 8 who must submit a report 
to the Commission. The Commission may adopt the 
report or dismiss the complaint (s.36). In the event that 
the complaint has not been settled during the 
investigation, or dismissed,9 the Commission may 
appoint a conciliator "for the purpose of attempting to 
bring about a settlement of the complaint" (s.37(1)). 
Terms of settlement may be referred to the Commission 
for approval or rejection (s.38). 
S.39 permits the Commission to appoint a Human 
Rights Tribunal at any stage after the filing of a 
complaint.10 The tribunal must notify the Commission, 
the complainant and the person against whom the 
complaint was made (and any other person, in its 
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discretion) of its investigation of the complaint, and 
must give an opportunity of appearing before the 
tribunal, presenting evidence, and making 
representations, to all persons notified (s.40). S.41 
provides that at the conclusion of its inquiry, the 
tribunal may make an appropriate order, including 
cessation of a discriminatory practice, and restriction of 
rights or compensation to the victim of the 
discriminatory practice.11 
S.45 prohibits intimidation or discrimination against 
anyone who makes a complaint under the Act. Further, 
s.46 provides for fines of up to $10,000 for an employer 
or employee organization guilty of an offence under the 
Act; it is an offence to fail to comply with the terms of 
any settlement of a complaint, to obstruct a tribunal or 
an investigator, to reduce wages in order to eliminate 
discrimination, or to contravene s.45. 
This overview of the legislation indicates that the 
primary focus of the Act is the resolution of individual 
cases of discrimination. The Act provides the means of 
investigating complaints and for negotiation and 
settlement where complaints are well-founded. There 
are also provisions for levying fines where there is an 
· offence under the Act, and the Commission has 
responsibilities for educating the public on issues of 
discrimination. Although in some ways the federal 
legislation may provide greater protection against 
discrimination than the provincial Acts, the overall 
pattern of the federal Act is similar to that adopted by· 
most of the provinces in Canada.12 The essential issue is 
whether this form of legislation can effectively curtail o 
prevent discriminatory practices in relation to women i 
the workforce. 
B. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ACT 
(1) Justifiable Discrimination: The Bona Fide 
Occupational Requirement 
The interpretation of the Act's provisions prohibitin~ 
discriminatory practices is the key to the quality of 
protection against discrimination for working women. 
Clearly, a broad interpretation of the discriminatory 
practices defined in ss. 7 -11 of the Act by the 
Commission will provide more opportunities for 
complaints to the Commission, and the possibility that 
the Commission's intervention will eliminate 
discriminatory practices. However, a very significant 
provision in this Part of the Act is s.14, the section whi1 
permits an employer to justify an existing 
discriminatory practice on the basis of a bona fide 
occupational requirement. An employer who can 
demonstrate that being male is a bona fide occupational 
requirement may continue a practice of employing on! 
male workers in particular job categories. Although th 
onus is on the employer to show entitlement to s.14 as 
defence to a charge of discrimination, an examination 
the interpretation of this phrase in similar statutes 
detracts from the efficacy of the newfederal Act as a 
means of protecting women from discrimination in 
employment. 
From a conceptual point of view, the bona fide 
occupational requirement can be criticized as an 
unnecessary part of the legislation. Since there is no 
suggestion that the Act's intent is to compel an emplo: 
to hire or promote an employee who is unqualified foi 
job or promotion, it is arguable that the explicit refere 
to a bona fide occupational requirement is superfluous 
significantly, however, it creates an exception 
h may tend in practice to perpetuate myths about 
propriateness of certain kinds of work for female 
yees, and encourage sex-stereotyping. An 
ican commentator13 has also suggested that the 
presence of a bona fide occupational requirement 
impede the investigation of complaints about sex 
imination by the members of an enforcement 
cy itself; it may encourage them to continue to view 
en as a stereotyped class rather than to focus on the 
ic abilities of the individual complainant. 
. wever, despite these objections, all14 Canadian 
inces include the bona fide occupational requirement 
exception to discriminatory practices in their 
an rights legislation. Overall, the requirement has 
ally been narrowly construed so that it has 
eded only where convincing evidence was 
ced to show that all persons of one sex were 
able of performing the job or whether it was 
sary to accommodate considerations of public 
ncy.15 Moreover, because s.14 is regarded as a 
ification for practices which would otherwise be 
. ibited as discriminatory, the onus is on the 
layer to establish that a bona fide occupational 
irement exists.16 
roblems relating to the definition of the bona fide 
upational requirement are well-illustrated in the 
isions of American courts. Like the Canadian Act, the 
erican legislation17 designates certain employment 
ctices unlawful if they are based on discrimination 
ause of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.18 
wever, s.703(e) provides that an employer (or others) 
not commit an unlawful employment practice 
in those certain instances where 
religion, sex, or national origin is a bona 
fide occupational qualification 
reasonably necessary to the normal 
operation of that particular business or 
enterprise ... 
he cases which interpret the bona fide occupational 
alification are not entirely consistent in the reasoning 
hey adopt. For example, in Weeks v. Southern Bell 
elephone and Telegraph Co.19 Bell gave evidence of its 
lief that the job of switchman was too onerous for 
women; however, Bell failed fo show that all or 
substantially all women would be unable to perform the 
tasks involved, and consequently the Court held that 
they were unable to claim that being male was a bona fide 
occupational requirement. However, the test used 
focused on the general characteristics of women as a 
group, and not the individual abilities of particular 
women. Thus, despite the apparent success of the 
complainant in Weeks, the test adopted in reaching the 
decision possessed inherent possibilities of sex-
stereotyping. 
Sex-stereotyping may also occur if the test adopted 
takes into account "the prevailing views in society" 
about women in the workforce. In Fogg v. New England 
Tel. and Tel. Co.,20 the basis of the complaint was a 
denial of promotion to a woman in a company where 
almost no positions in senior management were held by 
women. The court accepted that the company's practice 
of delegating women to junior positions reflected "the 
mores and standards" of our society rather than 
conscious policy of sex-discrimination. The effect is a 
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justification of maleness as a bona fide occupational 
requirement according to prevailing societal views about 
appropriate work for women. Interestingly, in Diaz v. 
Pan American World Airways Inc.,21 the prevailing 
view about women's work, as an appropriate criterion 
for employment decisions, was rejected. In that case, a 
male applicant for a job as a flight attendant complained 
of discrimination when the airline refused to hire him 
because its customers preferred females, and because of 
its view that the psychological needs of passengers were 
better served by females. The company's decision was 
upheld at trial, but reversed by the Court of Appeal, 
which stated that customer preference and convenience 
did not justify femaleness as a bona fide occupational 
requirement in the circumstances. The Court of Appeal 
did indicate, however, that the position might be altered 
if the airline were able to demonstrate that the essence of 
its business operation would be undermined. However, 
while this decision rejected prevailing societal views in 
the application of the test of bona fide occupational 
requirement, it nevertheless again focused on the general · 
qualities of males and females as groups rather than the 
individual qualities of particular men and women . 
The problem of "neutral" job requirements resulting 
in indirect discrimination also presents difficulties.22 In 
Gera v. New York Pennsylvania Pro Baseball Club,23 a 
female applicant for the job of professional referee was 
successful in establishing discrimination because the 
employer failed to prove that being male was a bona fide 
occupational requirement or that the height and weight 
requirements were job-related. In Berni,24 however, a 
woman police officer failed in a complaint of 
discrimination regarc\ing her failure to be promoted to 
the position of sergeant. The employer alleged that there 
were no women sergeants on the force because there 
were no patrol-women with sufficient experience for 
promotion, despite the fact that women were not given 
assignments from which they might acquire the 
necessary experience. In a similar case in Nova Scotia, 
Ryan v. Town of North Sydney,25 a woman applicant 
was denied a job as a police officer completely, on the 
assumption that she would have been unable to work 
the night shift. Although the tribunal found insufficient 
facts to prove discrimination in that case, one can 
speculate whether the prevailing views of the inability of 
women in general to work a night shift might have 
justified the employer's decision on the basis of a bona 
fide occupational requirement. 
In view of the inherent difficulties in applying a test of 
bona fide occupational requirement, the Advisory 
Council on the Status of Women recommended that the 
requirement should be restrictively interpreted, and that 
the situations to which it applied should be "few, clear, 
and precise." 26 More specifically, the Council 
recommended that no bona fide occupational 
requirement should be used if it was based on 
assumptions about the abilities of women in general, . 
rather than qualities of individual women. The Council 
also recommended that no employer should be entitled 
to refuse to hire on account of the preferences of co-
workers, clients, customers, or the employer, but that in 
cases where a female is genuinely required (such as an 
actress for a female stage role) sex could be a bona fide 
occupational requirement. • 
These guidelines are quite similar to those adopted by 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) in the United States. 27 The EEOC guidelines also 
provide for a narrow interpretation of the bona fide 
occupational qualification exception in relation to 
matters of sex discrimination. In particular, the 
guidelines state that the Commission will find the 
exception unwarranted where there is a refusal to hire 
because of sex based on assumptions of the comparative 
employment characteristics of women in general (such 
as an assumption of a high turnover rate among 
women); where there is a refusal to hire based on 
stereotyped characteristics of the sexes (such as 
assumptions that men are less capable of assembling 
intricate equipment or that women are less capable of 
aggressive selling); and where the refusal to hire is based 
on preferences of co-workers, the employer, clients or 
customers, except in cases requiring employees to be 
male or female for the purpose of authenticity or 
genuineness. 
The presence of s.14 in the Canadian Human Rights 
Act presents a challenge for the Commission. By 
narrowly construing the ambit of a bona fide 
occupational requirement, the Commission will enhance 
job opportunities for women in non-traditional work. 
However, in deciding whether discriminatory action 
based on occupational requirements is justified in 
particular cases, the Commission's interpretation of s.14 
clearly involves more than a mechanical application of a 
statutory formula. A decision whether s.14 applies to 
justify discriminatory behaviour involves attitudes and 
ideas about the roles of men and women in society at 
large as well as in the workplace and in the particular job 
concerned. Moreover, the decision also invites 
consideration of the usefulness of interference with the 
choice of personnel by private employers, and may 
invoke concern about the efficacy of "reverse 
discrimination." Thus s.14 is very significant not only 
because its interpretation will have immediate 
repercussions in the workforce and the job opportunities 
which may be available to women; in addition, s.14 
implicitly embodies unformulated ideas about the 
proper sphere for women in the workforce, leaving it to 
the tribunals established by the Commission to decide on 
a case-by-case basis whether decisions of employers 
reflect discrimination or merely /1 occupational 
requirements." The point is that ideas about what work 
should be done by women (and by men) form a 
fundamental part of our social structure so that 
decisions about the application of s.14 must always 
reflect, to a greater or lesser extent, the subjective social 
context in which they are made. The Commission's task 
is a difficult one because its ideas about appropriate jobs 
for women may differ substantially from those of 
employers, and because a decision by a Human Rights 
Tribunal that an employer may not rely on s.14 will in 
all likelihood require a very substantial reorganization of 
job structures within a particular workplace. To apply 
s.14 as the Advisory Council suggested would result in a 
fundamental restructuring of jobs in the Canadian 
workforce. 
The implications of s.14 for fundamental change in the 
structure of employment raises the major philosophical 
issues in connection with the Act. This issue is whether 
the Act is directed primarily to amelioration of the most 
glaring instances of sex discrimination in employment, 
or whether the Act is designed to effect a major 
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restructuring of the workforce so that men and women 
may have equal opportunities in their work. While this 
issue is of some significance in relation to the 
interpretation of s.14, it is critically important to the 
enforcement procedures of the Act, and its analysis in 
the context of enforcement highlights a major difficulty 
with the legislation. 
(2) Enforcing the Act: Individual Initiative and 
Voluntary Compliance 
Human rights legislation is generally directed at 
changing attitudes about discrimination and enforcing 
behaviour which is non-discriminatory. However, it is 
of some significance to determine whether the primary 
focus of legislation is changing attitudes or enforcing a 
code of behaviour, and there is an ongoing debate about 
the comparative effectiveness of Acts directed to each of 
these purposes. On the one hand, changing attitudes 
about discrimination through information and 
education programs can result in equality of opportunit 
by consensus, although the educative process may be a 
very long-term one. By contrast, legislating to prohibit 
discriminatory behaviour has much more immediate 
and obviqus effects, even though compelling non-
discriminatory behaviour may not result in any change 
in attitudes. Indeed, compelling employers to act 
without discrimination against women may actually 
entrench discriminatory attitudes despite conformity 
with legislative requirements. Legislation which has as 
its primary focus changing discriminatory attitudes 
through education programs reflects a view that 
discrimination can be curtailed or eliminated through 
awareness and understanding of the issue; it assumes 
that employers discriminate against women without 
being aware of the implications of their actions. By 
contrast, the underlying premise of legislation which, < 
its primary goal, compels non-discriminatory behavi01 
is that employers may choose to discriminate on the 
basis of sex in employment decisions because it is mon 
advantageous to them; in this context, changing 
attitudes alone will not be sufficient. 
This latter view accords with a view of sex 
discrimination as a structural or systemic problem of 
society. It assumes that the position of women in the 
workforce is related to economic and social forces whi 
shape the roles available to men and women, not 
according to the abilities of individuals, but because o~ 
the needs of the workforce and of the goals of employ1 
Advocates of this view assert that only by legislating 
changes in behaviour will effective changes in warner 
work occur. Of course, such legislation requires a 
substantial interference with the organization of the 
workforce and may result in considerable disruption 
employers. Not surprisingly, such legislation needs tc 
carefully drawn and thoughtful preparation for its 
introduction may be essential. 
The Canadian Human Rights Act is designed to af 
women's roles in the workforce both by means of 
_changing attitudes and also by compelling non-
discriminatory behaviour on the part of employers. I 
powers to conduct research and information progra1 
and to advise in relation to the adoption of special 
programs for disadvantaged groups, are clearly desi~ 
to increase awareness of and influence attitudes abo1 
human rights. At the same time, its powers to invest 
and hear complaints and to make recommendations 
act compliance" emphasize the Commission's role 
rcing non-discriminatory behaviour. Moreover, 
a.ls of changing attitudes on one hand and 
ling non-discriminatory behaviour on the other 
t mutually exclusive. Publicity about a hearing 
a Human Rights Tribunal may generate 
ness of human rights issues most effectively, so 
ompelling non-discriminatory behaviour in 
'on to one employer may have educative effects for 
mmunity at large. 
ever, an effective challenge to structural 
'mination against working women requires a 
ry legislative focus on changes in behaviour; 
ural discrimination is notthe result of a lack of 
eness but rather of a choice of priorities which 
rages continued discrimination against working 
n. To overcome structural discrimination against 
king women, the Commission must emphasize its 
ers to compel non-discriminatory behaviour among 
foyers; effective change cannot occur through 
cation alone. 
.he Canadian Human Rights Act relies substantially 
a complaints mechanism initiated by the victim of 
rimination. Yet substantial reliance on individual 
plaints of sex discrimination to trigger the complaint 
edures poses a number of problems. The 
plainant must first recognize that discrimination on 
basis of sex has occurred; interestingly, this may 
It in a failure to detect employers who adopt very 
tie forms of discrimination.28 This point was well-
mented by Leon Mayhew29 in a study of racial 
crimination, in which he noted the inappropriateness 
.a process relying on individual complaints of 
'scrimination in relation to middle and senior 
nagement positions. Promotion to these positions 
nerally depends, at least in part, on a colleageal 
lationship, which would usually be destroyed by 
dging a complaint of sex discrimination. Moreover, 
ayhew also suggested that complaints may be seen to 
ve less likelihood of success where the employer is a 
ry large or strategic concern, and the process may 
ever be triggered at all in relation to these employers. 
he overall effect of these criticisms of the complaint 
rocess is an inconsistent and piecemeal enforcement of 
the Act.30 
The enforcement provisions of the Act also adopt the 
norm of the provincial Acts in providing for conciliation 
and negotiation with employers against whom 
complaints are lodged. As has been suggested 
frequently, 31 there is a potential danger that acts of 
·discrimination by employers will be tolerated by the 
bargaining process. In view of the practical difficulties 
faced by a victim of sex discrimination who lodges a 
complaint but remains in the workplace, the prospect 
that her complaint may not result in any real sanction 
against the employer is another deterrent to the effective 
operation of the enforcement mechanisms of the Act. 
However, the Act does not rely solely on individual 
complaints to enforce its provisions; the Commission 
may also initiate complaints under the Act, although 
effective use of these powers may well require 
investigative resources beyond its capacity.32 In addition, 
the Commission may recommend contract compliance 
pursuant to s.19 and a tribunal may order affirmative 
action by an employer. These enforcement powers are 
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augmented by the educative role of the Commission. For 
~xample,.s.22 authorizes the Commission to develop 
mfo~~at10n programs and to "endeavour by persuasion, 
pubhc1ty, or any other means that it considers 
appr~priate" to discourage and reduce discriminatory 
pra~tlces. Pursuant to s.15, the Commission may also 
advise employers in relation to the adoption of 
voluntary programs of affirmative action in relation to 
certain employees including those discriminated against 
on the ?~sis of sex._ T~ese provisions obviously reflect a 
rec?gmtion that ehmm?tmg discrimination may require 
action.on? b~o~der basis than can be achieved by 
resolving md1v1dual complaints. 
~verall, the Act provides a wide range of measures 
which may be adopted by the Commission or its 
tribun.als to eliminate discriminatory attitudes and 
behaviour. However, it is essential to recognize that 
equal opportunity for working women cannot be 
achieved by education programs and complaints 
procedures dependent on victim-initiation. Such 
measures have had little effect in relation to sex 
discrimination in the past. For example, in 1967 the 
federal public service prohibited sex discrimination. Yet 
a study of the public service in 197033 indicated that 
women in the public service were still concentrated in 
low-paid and low-responsibility jobs, with shorter 
career ladders, and frequently classified to prevent 
sideways movement. In a similar study of the Toronto 
legal profession in 1971,34 40% of Toronto law firms 
openly admitted to a prejudicial attitude to women 
applicants for employment. The Ontario Human Rights 
Code was amended in 1971 to include" sex" and 
"marital status" as prohibited grounds of discrimination 
and sex discrimination was prohibited by the Codes of 
both the Canadian Bar Association and the Law Society 
of Upper Canada. However, a report in late 1978 
indicated widespread discrimination on the basis of sex 
in the Ontario legal profession.35 In such a context, the 
efficacy of measures which depend primarily on a 
victim-initiated complaint process, and voluntary 
compliance and educational procedures, must be called 
into question. 
There are also examples outside Canada. Theyecent 
report of the Equal Opportunities Commission in the 
United Kingdom36 indicates that there is "clearly a long 
way to go before equality between the sexes is achieved 
in the workplace."37 The report is based on a study 
conducted by the Commission to examine the 
effectiveness of the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975. The 
study indicates that the majority of industrial employers 
have taken formal steps to ensure avoidance of unlawful 
discrimination pursuant to the Act. Significantly, 
however, only 10% of employers had taken more 
positive action and conducted an analysis of their 
workforce (by sex and job category, pay level, etc.) to 
examine the status of women in their organization; 
moreover, only 2% had taken more specific action to 
create equal opportunities for women workers. Inthis 
latter category, one company had adopted a 
comprehensive analysis and monitoring system in 
relation to their employees; significantly, in the last four 
years, this company showed a 115% (from 41 to 89) 
increase in the number of women in middle and senior 
management grades. The Commission also noted a 
number of approaches to the EOC for guidance on 
developing policy to enhance equal opportunities for 
working women. However, overall, the change in 
employment practices was negligible, particularly in 
relation to job segregation, recruitment and training, 
and promotion. 
Despite these conclusions, the Commission's report is 
generally positive. In particular, it ends with the 
statement that: 
... it is important that those in industry 
take part in the discussion on equality of 
opportunity, since in due course the 
Commission's guidance publications 
will be worked into Statutory Codes of 
practice, over which of course the fullest 
prior consultation will take place. 38 
It is obvious that the Commission views the achievement 
of equality of opportunity for working women as a long 
term goal, and its achievements to this point as small, 
but significant, steps along the way. Undoubtedly, the 
education of public opinion, as well as industrial 
employers, is a very long term process. In view of 
experiences elsewhere, however, one might well 
question whether the long term goal can ever be effected 
by voluntary measures for creating equal opportunity. 
Indeed, the final paragraph of the Commission's report 
suggests that more coercive measures will be required in 
the future. The accomplishments of the UK Commission 
after three years may be an indication of what can be 
expected from the Canadian Commission after a similar 
period of operation. The critical question is whether it is 
enough. 
Some years ago, the answer to this question in the 
United States was a resounding no. Originally, Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made sex a prohibited 
ground of discrimination and established a complaint 
procedure before the Equal Employment Opportunities 
Commission with power to attempt settlements. The 
complainant or the Attorney/Ceneral (and since 1972, 
the EEOC) could also initiaye civil action, and could 
obtain injunctions, ordersfor re-instatement or back-
pay, etc. However, since 1968, recognizing the need for a 
broader-based approach to the problem, Congress 
granted the power to the EEOC to conduct industry-
wide investigations to deal with sex discrimination. The 
celebrated case involving American Tel. and Tel. Co. 
resulted from one such investigation.39 Thus, exercising 
its authority and resources to initiate investigations 
rather than depending on the individual complaint 
mechanism,40 the EEOC has effected a very substantial 
change in the opportunities for women workers 
at AT&T. 
Interestingly, equal employment opportunities were 
also enhanced in the U.S. A. by an altogether different 
technique. From 1965, Presidential Executive Orders 
instituted contract compliance requirements for all 
government contracts with companies of more than fifty 
employees or whether the value of the contract exceeded 
$50,000.41 The requirement included the adoption of 
affirmative action programs and was monitored by the 
Office of Federal Contract Compliance. The penalty for 
failure to comply was the severance of contractual 
relations; in addition, the Secretary of Labor was 
empowered to publish names of uncooperative 
companies or to recommend criminal proceedings or 
Title VII actions. These measures, in particular, forced 
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behavioural change on employers, with or without 
attitudinal change, and represent a clear departure from 
measures which focus primarily on changing attitudes. 
While s.19 in the Canadian Human Rights Act presents 
a clear opportunity for a similar program in Canada, it is 
less clear that the opportunity will be accepted. 
Many commentators regard measures like those in the 
U.S. A. to be necessary to provide equal opportunities 
for working women. However, it is clear that the goal of 
changing attitudes, assuming that it may also be 
successful over a very much longer time span, is not 
without its attraction. A society in which there is no 
adverse discrimination because of a consensus that such 
discrimination robs both individuals and society as a 
whole of full potential is an excellent ideal. The danger 
in opting for the elimination of discrimination by 
changing attitudes alone, however, is that very little real 
progress will occur, even over an extended period of 
time. The focus on conciliation in the complaints 
procedure may, at worst, result in little more than band-
aid relief for the victim, and do little to change the ideas 
of an employer about his or her discriminatory attitudes. 
There is little stigma attached to discrimination and the 
sanctions which may be imposed are not really 
substantial (at least by comparison with the U.S. A. ), 
even when they are actually levied. In the result, the Act 
appears to regard discrimination as a problem, but not 
one for which it is necessary to adopt firm and effective 
procedures. By contrast, the invasion of property rights 
in society is regarded as much more serious than the 
interference with a female employee's opportunities 
within the workforce.42 
Overall, the Canadian Human Rights Act may 
deserve the accolade bestowed on it as the "leader in 
human rights matters" in Canada, but this view should 
not obscure the fact that the legislation does not, from a 
theoretical perspective, provide a means for effectively 
ensuring equal opportunities for women workers. 43 This 
view by no means suggests that the Act is useless. On the 
contrary, just as provincial human rights legislation has 
contributed to an understanding of discrimination in the 
workplace, the federal Commission will undoubtedly be 
of some assistance. However, it is essential to understand 
the limitations inherent in the legislative choices of the 
Act, and to recognize that the goal of eliminating sex 
discrimination in employment is unlikely to be wholly 
achieved by the means adopted. More significantly, it is 
essential to recognize this Act's limitations in order to 
ensure that the Act will not be regarded as having solved 
the problem of discrimination against women in the 
workforce. 
C. THE CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS 
COMMISSION: THE FIRST YEAR 
In our first report, we committed 
ourselves to use the tools of recourse, 
awareness and advocacy to ensure that 
the legislation that established the 
Canadian Human Rights Commission 
fulfilled its important purpose. The past 
twelve months are crowded with 
examples of our efforts to gain support 
for our objectives by translating the 
principle of equality of opportunity into 
everyday experience. 44 
This statement, from the Preface of the Commission's 
NNUAL REPORT for 1978, indicated that initiatives 
ere undertaken by the Commission to implement 
rinciples of equality. The preface further indicated that 
the Commission's work encompassed both "providing a 
means of redressing individual complaints" and 
"contributing to the process of attitudinal change."4s In 
ddition, the ANNUAL REPORT clearly evidenced 
oncern for structural discrimination. For example, 
. 1though the Commission recognized that 
discrimination may occur as a result of "intentional 
bigotry" or "irrational prejudice", it also recognized that 
some forms of discrimination required a different 
explanation. 46 
We cannot therefore define 
discrimination purely in terms of 
behaviour motivated by evil intentions; 
the definition has to include the impact 
of whole systems on the lives of 
individuals-what is called structural or 
systemic discrimination. As well as 
offering redress in isolated cases of 
discrimination against specific 
individuals, therefore, the Commission 
must study employment systems and 
social programs from the point of view 
of their effect on certain groups ... 
[where] a system established for some 
other purpose ... operates to exclude 
some people from opportunities that it 
makes available to others. 47 
These statements are of special importance in relation 
to discrimination against working women since it is 
clear that measures which affect structural barriers to 
equal opportunity are needed in addition to those which 
provide redress for individual complaints. However, an 
assessment of the work of the Commission in its first 
year, at least in relation to sex discrimination, indicates 
small successes in relation to individual complaints 
rather than effective change in relation to structural 
barriers to equal opportunity for women. Moreover, 
despite the existence of legislative provisions to compel 
non-discriminatory behaviour, the primary emphasis of 
the Commission's work in the sex discrimination area 
has been on attitudinal and long-term change. 
(1) Complaints and Compliance. 
There were 2929 inquiries, complaints and requests 
for referrals to the Canadian Human Rights Commission 
in 1978.48 However, only 164 were accepted for 
investigation, and, of these, 26 were dismissed after 
investigation and 10 withdrawn by the complainant; 
only 11 were settled after investigation.49 Since most of 
the formal complaints, 117 in number, were still pending 
at the end of December 1978, it is virtually impossible to 
assess the effectiveness of the complaints procedure. 
Moreover, the statistics do not indicate the number of 
complaints related to sex discrimination, so a 
comparison with other forms of discrimination is also 
impossible. It is significant, however, that there is no 
mention in the statistics of any complaints initiated by 
the Commission itself (as permitted by the Act), so that 
the complaints mechanism appears to have relied wholly 
on victim-initiation.so 
The ANNUAL REPORT contained some examples of 
complaints to the Commission based on sex 
7 
discrimination. In one case, 51 three women were fired by 
a transportation company because of a company policy 
with regard to women working on a road crew. 
Although the foreman was satisfied with the work of 
these employees, company policy prevented their 
employment because of inadequate facilities for the 
women; in fact, however, the foreman had made 
arrangements for separate facilities in relation to this 
particular crew. After investigation by the Commission, 
a settlement was reached: the three complainants 
received written apologies, compensation for lost income 
and incidental expenses incurred as a result of the 
termination, and offers of employment. 52 The company 
also issued written instructions to all its departments 
ordering compliance with the act. 
The ANNUAL REPORT indicates that it received 
several other complaints53 about company policies 
affecting the admission of women to the Armed Forces 
and to amateur sports, and about height requirements 
which effectively denied women access to employment. 
A complaint about a denial of employment 
opportunities by Bell Canada in fulfilling its contract 
with Saudi Arabia was investigated by the Commission, 
and conciliation was started. There were also complaints 
about discrimination based on prejudice rather than 
stated policy, and complaints about practices which 
differentiated adversely against working mothers, in 
areas such as maternity leave and benefits. The 
Commission also reported that sexual harassment is "a 
discriminatory barrier to the professional development 
of women."54 
It is clear, however, from the ANNUAL REPORT that 
the Commission's primary emphasis in handling 
complaints was on conciliation to produce settlements. 
The human rights officer assigned to 
investigate the formal complaint takes 
the initial approach that the 
complainant is seeking help with a 
problem, and that he or she will 
cooperate in providing all possible 
evidence to get to the truth of the 
matter. The investigator also assumes 
that the person or organization 
complained of ... is not intentionally 
discriminating, and will want to 
cooperate fully with the investigation.ss 
To protect this spirit of cooperation, information 
obtained in the investigation is routinely restricted to the 
two parties, although the terms of settlement may be 
publicized with the consent of both parties "to help the 
Commission maximize the voluntary efforts of 
organizations and individuals to be fair and non-
discriminatory.''s6 
Moreover, it is clear that most complaints do not result 
in a formal hearing by a Human Rights Tribunal 
established under the Act. By February 1979, only three 
tribunals had been announced and none had yet been 
established.57 Interestingly, two of these first three 
tribunals were required as a result of claims of 
discrimination based on sex and marital status. In one, a 
woman complained after a denial 
1
of employment .as a 
member of the Governor-General s Foot Guards; m the 
other a woman complained after she was informed that 
she could not claim an income tax deduction for a man 
whom she supported and with whom she had lived in a 
common law marriage relationship for five years. Both 
these cases have potential as precedents affecting many 
other women in similar circumstances and both cases 
also involve a Department or agency of the federal 
government. It is probably significant that in such cases 
conciliation has proved unsuccessful; where the rights 
of a single individual are concerned, conciliation may be 
useful to resolve the problem, but where the issue has 
far-reaching consequences for many people, cooperation 
from employers, including the federal government, is 
less likely. This situation underlines the need for 
measures in addition to the complaints process to 
eliminate discrimination. 
No recommendations for contract compliance were 
made by the Commission in 1978. The ANNUAL 
REPORT stated58 that the Commission required 
clarification of "the implication and effectiveness" of 
s.19 before requesting such regulations. Moreover, 
because contractors under provincial jurisdiction must 
already comply with the provincial human rights 
legislation, s.19 must be implemented in the context of 
federal-provincial relations. 
Overall, the ANNUAL REPORT of 1978 indicates that 
the Commission has established procedures and 
initiated the process of complaints-investigation. 
However, it is clear that its primary emphasis is on 
conciliation, which will affect only the rights of the 
individual complainant, and that it has yet to embark on 
investigation initiated other than by the victim of 
discrimination. Moreover, the Commission has not 
exercised its legislative power to recommend contract 
compliance, and there are no indications that it will do 
so in the near future. 59 However, in view of the large 
number of cases pending at the end of 1978, 6° and the 
problems of staff allocation encountered,61 any real 
analysis of the Commission in terms of complaints and 
compliance must be deferred. It is sufficient to point out 
that the present trend appears to be a primary emphasis 
on voluntary compliance and conciliation, despite the 
existence of legislative provisions which could compel 
compliance. In the context of discrimination against 
women in the workplace, the continuation of such a 
trend is unlikely to produce substantial changes. 
(2) Education Programs and Attitudinal Change 
The Commission has initiated a number of programs 
to increase awareness of human rights issues. In 
particular, its efforts in relation to equal pay have great 
significance for women workers. In September 1978, the 
equal pay guidelines were announced, and the 
Commission released information pamphlets outlining 
the meaning and application of equal pay. 62 The 
Commission has also introduced an Equality in 
Employment program which is intended to assist 
employers to comply with the Act.63 In addition, there 
are Special Programs Officers of the Commission 
available to improve opportunities for particular groups 
or to prevent, reduce or eliminate disadvantages caused 
to groups, including women.64 Special programs may be 
introduced voluntarily or as part of a settlement, and the 
Commission's goal is to find solutions "that meet the 
employer's business needs, avoid complaints of 'reverse 
discrimination' and meet the long term objective of 
correcting the disadvantages faced by many people."65 
Special programs involving affirmative action could be 
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very effective in that their impact is on women as a 
group rather than just on an individual complainant. 
Unfortunately, the ANNUAL REPORT of 1978 contains 
too few details of the Equality Employment program or 
of Special Programs relating to sex discrimination to 
evaluate them properly as means of ensuring equality of 
opportunity for working women. As with complaints, 
however, it is clear that the primary emphasis of the 
Commission is on voluntary compliance achieved by 
attitudinal change. In pursuit of this goal, the 
Commission published a wide range of literature and 
Commission members were very busy during 1978 with 
speaking engagements to publicize the work of the 
Commission. 
In relation to its goal of increasing awareness of 
human rights, the Commission has also been active in 
monitoring proposed federal legislation. In the context 
of discrimination against working women, the 
Commission made recommendations on Bill C-14 (An 
Act to Amend the Unemployment Insurance Act), 
particularly in relation to s.30 and s.46 (which disentitle 
pregnant employees to more than fifteen weeks of 
maternity benefits despite availability for work during 
the early months of pregnancy). 66 The Minister of 
Employment and Immigration replied that the proposed 
legislation was not discriminatory towards women, and 
the Commission has undertaken further studies as a 
result of data supplied by the Minister.67 Subsequently, 
in March 1979, the Canadian Advisory Council on the 
Status of Women announced its intention to complain 
formally to the Commission about a regulation under 
the Unemployment Insurance Act which requires an 
employee to work at least twenty hours per week to 
qualify for benefits under the Act.68 The regulation 
excludes many part-time workers from benefits 
coverage, and 71 % of part-time workers are female.69 
Even prior to the complaint, the Commission had been 
investigating the impact of the regulation to assess 
whether it was "in keeping with the spirit" of the 
Canadian Human Rights Act.70 In so doing, the 
Commission was performing a useful monitoring role to 
ensure that federal legislation conforms to the 
requirements of the Act. Unfortunately, the process 
requires long hours of investigation and negotiation, 
and to date, the Commission has not been successful in 
ensuring implementation of the changes it has 
recommended. 
In view of the short time-span of the Commission's 
work, it is again difficult to form definite conclusions 
about its effectiveness in changing attitudes about 
women's roles in the workforce. It has engaged in a wide 
variety of activities, and designed a number of programs 
to extend awareness of the Act's provisions and to assist 
voluntary compliance. Although there is little concrete 
evidence of change in employment opportunities for 
women after one year, it is probably too early to expect 
substantial changes as a result of these measures. The 
danger is that, even after a number of years, little change 
will have occurred. The Commission's emphasis on 
voluntary compliance as a result of awareness and 
attitudinal change is clear, but only time will indicate the 
wisdom of its choice. Despite the validity of a focus on 
attitudinal change in combatting some forms of 
discrimination, experience elsewhere suggests that more 
·direct and compulsory measures are needed to eliminate 
discrimination against women who work. As has been 
demonstrated, the Canadian Human Rights Act 
·presents difficulties from a theoretical perspective in 
relation to the opportunities for working women. 
Moreover, at the end of its first year, it is clear that the 
·Commission has yet to take full advantage of all of the 
0pportunities presented by the legislation. Within the 
context of the legislation, the Commission must re-
evaluate the focus of its efforts in relation to sex 
discrimination in the workplace. Half the population of 
Canada deserves a better chance for "social justice", and, 
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in the Commission's words, "social justice" demands no 
less than "social change."71 · 
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